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Case No. 20170904-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a conviction for one count of tax evasion, a second
degree felony, and three counts of failure to render a tax return, a third
degree felony, all in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101, in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Roger S. Dutson, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2018).
INTRODUCTION
Scott Alan Rasmussen has a good faith disagreement with the Utah
State Tax Commission. The Tax Commissions claims he owes income tax.
Rasmussen believes he doesn’t. This dispute dates back to 2002 when, after
extensive research, Rasmussen concluded that he is a “common law

employee” whose wages and compensation do not constitute reportable
income and that, therefore, he had no duty to file income tax returns.
But he knew he had a duty to notify the government, and so in 2002
he filed W-4 forms stating his exempt status. The Internal Revenue Service
acquiesced, and for more than a decade his exempt status was
unchallenged. Then, in 2013, the Utah State Tax Commission notified
Rasmussen that he owed back taxes. Rasmussen responded with a detailed
memorandum explaining the legal basis for his exemption. But the Tax
Commission rejected Rasmussen’s rational and he was ultimately charged
with 12 counts of criminal tax violations. Jurors acquitted him of most of the
charges, but convicted on four. Rasmussen appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on
Rasmussen’s “good faith” belief that he was not required to file income tax
returns.
Standard of Review: Where a defendant is legally entitled to have a
particular instruction given to the jury, the trial court’s failure to do so is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2012 UT
54, ¶13, 285 P.3d 1208.
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Preservation: This issue is preserved by defense counsel’s objection to
removing language concerning good faith as a defense to all of the counts.
R514, 516,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary of facts.

Scott Rasmussen is not a tax protester. Nor does he believe that taxes
are unconstitutional or otherwise illegal. Rather, he simply believes,
based on his own extensive research, that a “common law employee,”
such as himself, has no “income,” as that term is defined in the tax code
and other government publications, and therefore is exempt from the
require to pay income tax or file tax returns.
For those reasons, he has filed no tax returns for more than a decade.
For those reasons, he also went to prison.
“I dug into it.”
While

working

as

a

manufacturing

engineer

for

Boing,

Rasmussen and his wife paid income tax from 1989 through 1999. R581.
Then, after paying his taxes for 2000, he received a “nice letter” from the
IRS stating that he owed an additional $2500. R581. “I got mad and paid
it.” Id. But
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when he was assessed a deficiency again the following year—this time for
$3000—he decided to research the basis for his tax liability. Id.
At trial, he explained his thinking: “Well, first of all, why am I

paying taxes? What’s it all about? You know? What does it mean to pay
taxes? You know? So I dug into it.” R582.
The “aha!” moment
Rasmussen spent many countless hours in the evening researching
his tax liability. His conclusions, although contrary to standard
interpretations of the tax code, display an internal logic and are
grounded in statutes, tax publications, and case law. See R574-607
(Rasmussen testimony) and State’s Exhibit 16 (Memorandum of Points
and Authorities (“Rasmussen Memo.”)).
Rasmussen testified that the “aha!” moment came when he was
reviewing IRS publications 560 and 15, which discuss the difference
between an independent contractor, a statutory employee, and a
common law employee. R586; see Retirement Plans for Small Business
(SEP, SIMPLE, and Qualified Plans), I.R.S. Pub. No. 560, Cat. No. 46574N
(February 3, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p560--2013.pdf;
Employer's Tax Guide, I.R.S. Pub. No. 15, Cat. No. 10000W (February 5,
2013), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p15--2013.pdfi “Publication
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560 addresses a common law employee under definitions you need to
know, and it says right in there a common law employee is not selfemployed.” Id. He concluded that “if you file a 1040 and you don't know
any better you automatically became a business. Okay? And it's known
as a sole proprietorship.” R583. “So I am realizing, wow, okay, I'm not a
business while I am at work, but yet somehow when I pay taxes I'm a
business.” R586.
As Rasmussen saw it, only businesses had “income” because only
“profit” constitutes “income” for tax purposes. See R583. “The point that
I’ve been trying to make all along is that in order to pay taxes, you
necessarily have to be a business entity. The State has been unable to
identify which type of business entity that I am. So I don't mind
complying, but I wish that they would have been able to be more explicit
about the basis, the fundamental fact of why I need to pay taxes on my
employment pay.” R690.
In his memorandum, Rasmussen discusses the “3 Categories of
Control”—Behavioral Control, Financial Control, and the Relationship, of
the

parties—which

determine

whether

a

worker

is

a

business/independent contractor, who generates taxable income, or an
employee, who does not. R724; see also Independent Contractor vs.
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Employee, I.R.S. Topic 762, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc762. One
criterion defining an employee is the “extent to which the worker can
realize a profit or incur a loss.” R724. Rasmussen concluded:
I am a common law employee. I do not consider my payroll
wages as income, as would an independent contractor. I have
no opportunity for profit or gain, as would an independent
contractor. Therefore, I have no realized tax liability, unlike
an independent contractor, and no requirement to file an
income tax return. I am mindful that this is in regard to my
employment wages only.
R724 (emphasis in original). At trial, he testified: “I decided to terminate
my business as a sole proprietor, because all I recognized was a loss,
because I had—I had no—I was in no position to see a profit. So what I
did was I filed exempt on my W-4 form.” Id.
In 2002, Rasmussen filed a W-4 form along with a handwritten note
to the IRS explaining that he was exempt from paying income tax. R58687. In response, the IRS wrote: “We are returning the document checked
at the right (Form W-4). Please keep them for your records unless
otherwise indicated.” Rasmussen interpreted this response as tacit
agreement from the IRS to his asserted exemption:
After receiving this reply from the IRS, I thought that if I
were in error the IRS would have taken this opportunity to
do its “due diligence” to clarify the matter and straighten
me out. Neither myself nor any of my Employers have
received a “lock in letter” or “Modification Notice” since I
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began filing EXEMPT in June 2002. I have assumed that all
my employers have followed the requirements as stated in
Publication 505 (2002). And that both the IRS and Utah Tax
Commission were aware of my Exempt from withholding.
R725 (emphasis in original); see also R602-03.
Each year for more than a decade, Rasmussen filed W-4s. See
Defendant’s Exhibit 1 (W-4 forms for 2010-12). His exempt status was
never challenged until 2013 when he received a letter from the
Commission informing him that he owed taxes. R689. After receiving the
letter, Rasmussen “dug into it” again and renewed his research into state
and federal tax law. R590.
In his memorandum, Rasmussen quotes from a Commission
publication titled “Who Must File a Utah Income Tax Return.” It states
that the “following individuals must file individual tax returns:
1. Every Utah resident or part-year resident who must
file a federal income tax return;
2. Every nonresident with income from Utah sources
who must file a federal return; and
3. Taxpayers wanting a refund of any income tax
overpaid.
R722. Rasmussen concluded: “I understand this to mean that if there is
no requirement to file a federal income tax return, then there is no
requirement to file a state income tax return. Both returns are contingent
upon recognized income. Either both returns (Federal and State) are
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required or both are not required.” Id.
B.

Procedural history.

Rasmussen was charged by Information with six counts of intent to
evade, a second degree felony, and six counts of failing to render a tax
return, a third degree felony, for the years 2011 to 2016. R82-87. He was also
charged with one count of pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree
felony, for 2006 through 2016. R87-88.
On the second day of trial, the court granted a defense motion to
dismiss the pattern of unlawful activity after determining that Rasmussen
acted alone, had not conspired or attempted to indoctrinate anyone, and
therefore could not be considered an “enterprise” for purposes of the
statute. R568-69. In his ruling, the judge stated: “I think normally we think
of enterprise as some kind of a business or some type of an organization for
funneling the energies and activities into criminal conduct. This case
appears to me to be a case where if the defendant is guilty of the other
offenses that are charged that he was doing it on his own. There doesn't
appear to be any other persons involved in this activity.” R568.
The jury convicted Rasmussen on four counts, but acquitted him on
eight other charges. R659. Rasmussen was convicted on one count of tax
evasion for 2016 and three counts of failure to render tax returns for 2014
through 2016. R659; see also Jury Instructions 8, 10, 11, and 12.
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Rasmussen was sentenced to zero to five years on the three counts of
failure to file and one to 15 years on the single count of tax evasion. R691.
He was also ordered to pay restitution of $23,930, an amount that later
reduced by stipulation to $11,597. Id.; see R313-14. He was ordered to begin
his sentence “forthwith” on October 20, 2017, and he remains incarcerated.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rasmussen’s extensive research into his tax liability and his
unwavering conclusion that he is exempt from income tax demonstrates a
good faith belief that he did not owe taxes. If the trial court had adequately
instructed the jury on the “good faith” defense, there is a reasonable
probability that Rasmussen would have been acquitted on all counts. The
trial court should have explicitly instructed the jury that Rasmussen’s good
faith belief, which was premised on his exhaustive review of official tax
code rules and publications, exempted him from tax liability. The trial
court’s rejection of such an instruction was prejudicial error that requires
reversal of Rasmussen’s convictions.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN
OMITTING
A
JURY
INSTRUCTION
ON
RASMUSSEN’S “GOOD FAITH” DEFENSE OF HIS
EXEMPT STATUS.
A.

Ignorance of the law is no excuse—except when it
comes to tax law.

As the United Stated Supreme Court has stated: “The general rule
that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal
prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system.” Cheek v. U.S.,
498 U.S. 192, 199, 111 S.Ct. 604 (1991); see also, e.g., United States v. Rosenfield,
469 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1972) (in failure-to-file case, “ignorance of a crime
is no excuse, but ignorance of a duty may be where, as here, willfulness is
an element of the crime”).
But even that bedrock legal principle has at least one exception.
Because of the complexity of the tax laws, most jurisdictions accept the
proposition that a defendant may be acquitted of certain criminal tax
charges if the violations are premised on a good faith misinterpretation of
the tax code. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199. The “proliferation of statutes and
regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to know
and comprehend the extent of the duties and obligations imposed by the tax
laws.” Id. at 199-200.
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In recognition of this legal complexity, Congress “softened the
impact” of tax code violations by stating that defendant cannot be convicted
of tax evasion unless the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt a
specific intent to violate the law. Id. at 200. Supreme Court jurisprudence
has dovetailed with Congressional intent by interpreting the term
“willfully” in criminal tax statutes to mean “an act done with a bad
purpose” or “with an evil motive.” United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389,
394-94, 54 S.Ct. 223 (1933). “Congress did not intend that a person, by
reason of a bona fide misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to
his duty to make a return, or as to the adequacy of the records he
maintained, should become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to
the prescribed standard of conduct.” Id., at 396, 54 S.Ct., at 226.1

1

Many courts have limited the “good faith” defense. For example, at
least two federal courts of appeal have stated that good faith is not a defense
to fraud. United States v. Hildebrandt, 961 F.2d 116, 119 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The
Cheek holding was premised on the complexity of the tax laws, and
Hildebrandt was convicted under a general criminal statute containing a
straightforward prohibition against making false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statements to the government”); United States v. Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441, 1444
(10th Cir. 1992) (good faith exception not available to defendants charged
with bank mail and bank fraud). Nonetheless, the United States Supreme
Court has declined to limit the good faith defense to cases involving income
tax evasion or failure to file. In Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141, 114
S.Ct. 655 (1994), the court held that good faith may also excuse currency
structuring, which “is not inevitably nefarious” and is often undertaken for
legal purposes.
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Many jurisdictions, including the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, which
includes Utah, have stated that the good faith defense is available even if a
defendant’s interpretations of the tax laws are irrational. “We must remind
ourselves here that the good-faith defense need not be rational, if there is
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that even
irrational beliefs were truly held.” United States v. Mann, 884 F.2d 532, 537
(10th Cir. 1989).
In Mann, the defendant was convicted of failure to file tax returns,
despite evidence that he believed he was exempt, in part because he
believed wages were not income. Id. at 534. The 10th Circuit reversed,
holding that a defendant “cannot be held to guilty knowledge of falsity of
his statements simply because a reasonable man under the same or similar
circumstances would have known of the falsity of such statements.” Id.
(citation and internal punctuation omitted).
The Mann case offers a template for the robust good faith defense that
should have been available to Rasmussen. Mann was convicted of mail
fraud, wire fraud and willful failure to file income tax returns over a 10-year
period. Mann testified that his failure to file was based on years of research,
including United States Supreme Court decisions that led him to believe he
was not required to file income tax returns. Id. at 534. Among Mann’s
theories was his belief, similar to Rasmussen’s, that taxes applied only to
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corporations and that wages are not income. Id. But, unlike Rasmussen,
Mann widely disseminated his views, which he compiled and published in
the Spotlight, a magazine with worldwide subscription. Id. He also
publicized his views through a purchased advertisement on a radio station.
Id.
On appeal, the 10th Circuit affirmed Mann’s conviction for mail fraud,
but reversed the convictions for wire fraud and failure to file. Id. at 536. The
court held that the evidence was sufficient to support failure to file, but held
that the trial court erred when it did not explicitly instruct the jury
regarding Mann’s good faith defense. Id. As the court stated: “We have held
that a defendant’s good-faith belief that he is not required to file a return is a
valid defense in this context, and the beliefs need not be reasonable if
actually held in good faith.” Id.
With regard to the requisite mental state, the court held that a
“general instruction” on willfulness was insufficient. Id. at 537. “[T]he
general instruction on willfulness given here is not adequate in this circuit
to present the defense of good faith.” Id. In support, the 10th Circuit cited
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 108 S.Ct. 883, 887 (1988), which held:
“As a general proposition a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any
recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a
reasonable jury to find in his favor.” Three years later, the United States
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Supreme Court reiterated the importance of instructing the jury on the need
for finding that the tax evader act willfully. Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192, 111
S.Ct. 604 (1991). “[I]t was error for the court to instruct the jury that
petitioner’s asserted beliefs that wages are not income and that he was not a
taxpayer within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code should not be
considered by the jury in determining whether Cheek had acted willfully.”
Id. at 206-07.
Some jurisdictions, including Utah, have been reluctant to follow the
lead of the Supreme Court and Congress in to “soften the impact” of
criminal tax violations. In State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, 72 P.3d 692, cert.
denied, 84 P.3d 239 (2003), the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed a trial judge’s
refusal to instruct the jury that a defendant who acted in good faith could
not be convicted of failure to file a tax return and willful evasion. The Smith
panel also cited State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ¶20, 17 P.3d 1153, which
held that a separate good faith instruction was unnecessary because “a jury
finding that the defendant has acted knowingly and willfully is inconsistent
with a finding that the defendant acted in good faith” (citation and internal
punctuation omitted). The Smith panel concluded that jury instructions on
the question of good faith were adequate because, when read as a whole,
they defined intentional or willful conduct in terms that “ensured that a jury
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finding of good faith would lead to acquittal.” Smith, 2003 UT App 179 at
¶23 (citation and internal punctuation omitted).
Nonetheless, more recent Utah cases suggest that an explicit good
faith or “mistake of law” defense insulates a defendant from liability. “[T]he
taxpayer can escape the penalty if he or she can show that he or she based
the nonpayment of taxes on a legitimate, good faith interpretation of an
arguable point of law.” Benjamin v. Utah State Tax Com’n, 2011 UT 14, ¶32,
250 P.3d 39 (2011) In State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185, 236 P.3d 161 (2010),
this Court recognized that a mistake of law provides a defense where the
mistake shows a lack of specific intent to violate the law. Id. at ¶31.
Although we acknowledge that the Mistake of Law Statute
indicates a legislative intent that a mistake of law defense
must be based upon a reasonable reliance on official
statements of the law, we also recognize that a good faith
belief, although objectively unreasonable, could arguably
negate a specific intent.
Id. at ¶32. In State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, 179 P.3d 792 (2008), the Utah Supreme
Court reversed the defendant’s conviction on six counts of felony tax
evasion because the state had not proven the amount of the defendant’s tax
deficiency and a relatively minor deficiency could show that the defendant
had acted in good faith. The court stated:
Even where the State may have been able to prove that a tax
was due and owing, that tax may have been small enough that
the jury could have found that Eyre in good faith believed that
he did not have a tax deficiency and did not file as a result.
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The probability of this result is sufficient to undermine our
confidence in the verdicts rendered by the jury.
Id. at ¶19.
Like most people, Rasmussen paid income tax throughout much of
his adult life. But in 2002, after receiving what he regarded as excessive tax
deficiencies, Rasmussen decided to research the basis for the government’s
authority to assess income tax against him. After countless hours reviewing
an estimated 75 volumes of IRS tax publications, R582, he concluded that he
was a “common law employee” and that, as such, his wages and
compensation were not “income” as that term is defined for tax purposes.
R583. As argued below, a properly worded good faith instruction would
have resulted in a different verdict for Rasmussen because jurors would
have been given the option to find that his extensive research into tax law
led him to the reasonable belief that he was exempt and not required to file
tax returns.
B.

The court’s general instructions on willfulness and
intent were inadequate because they did not fully
apprise jurors that Rasmussen’s good faith was a
complete defense.

The trial court erred in refusing to explicitly instruct jurors that
Rasmussen was acting on his good faith belief that he was not required to
file income tax returns—and that his good faith belief was a complete
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defense. This error prejudiced the verdict against Rasmussen and requires
reversal.
The court’s “failure to give requested jury instructions constitutes
reversible error only if their omission tends to mislead the jury to the
prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises
the jury on the law.” State v. Van Oostendorp, 2017 UT App 85, ¶12, 397 P.3d
877 (citation omitted). In prosecutions for tax violations, clear and explicit
instructions on good faith are critical to properly guide and avoid
misleading the jury. “[I]nstructions on willfulness, on aspects of intent, on
untruth of representations or fraudulent statements are not sufficient for this
purpose. There must be a full and clear submission of the good faith defense
as such.” United States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716, 718 (10th Cir.1984) (en banc)
(emphasis in original).
Here, the jury instructions did not provide a “full and clear
submission” of Rasmussen’s good faith belief that he was not required to
pay income tax. Indeed, the court explicitly rejected the defense’s proposed
good faith instruction, which read:
The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Rasmussen knew that the law imposed a duty on him, and
Rasmussen intentionally and voluntarily violated that duty. A
person who acts on a good faith misunderstanding as to the
requirements of the law does not act willfully even if his
understanding of the law is wrong or unreasonable.
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Nevertheless, merely disagreeing with the law does not
constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the law.
R188.
The trial court removed this instruction, stating that “[i]t goes too
far.” R516. In fact, the instruction is an accurate statement of the law as
articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Cheek opinion and in the Utah
Supreme Court’s holdings in Eyre and Steel.
In Cheek, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the mens rea element
for tax violations is proven only by “negating a defendant’s claim of
ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the
law, he had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any of the
provisions of the tax laws.” Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202. The court reasoned that it
would be contradictory to allow a defendant to be convicted of violating a
duty imposed by a criminal statute, even though he was “ignorant of it,
misunderstand[s] the law, or believe[s] that the duty does not exist.” Id.; see
also Steele, 2010 UT App 185, ¶32 (“[W]e also recognize that a good faith
belief, although objectively unreasonable, could arguably negate a specific
intent”); Eyre, 2008 UT 16, ¶19 (if properly instructed, jurors could have
found that defendant’s tax filings were made in good faith).
A separate instruction on good faith is not required in the prosecution
of most offenses, see, e.g. United States v. Chavis, 461 F.3d 1201, 1209 (10th
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Cir.2006) (good faith instruction is not necessary “because [e.g.] a finding of
the intent to defraud . . . necessarily implies that there was no good faith”),
although a number of courts have endorsed the use of a separate good faith
instruction when appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Favato, 533 F. App'x
127, 131 (3d Cir. 2013)

(district court properly submitted separate

instruction explaining that good faith “would be a complete defense—
inconsistent with his acting knowingly, intentionally, or willfully. These
instructions correctly stated the law . . .”).
Here, the statements on “good faith” in Rasmussen’s jury instructions
were parsimonious and limited to only the mens rea instructions on two of
the six charges of failure to file. In each instance, the instructions mention
good faith by nesting it within the mens rea element instructions 10 and 12:
“You cannot convict him [Rasmussen] of this offense unless, based on the
evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt” that he failed to render tax
returns “(3) Knowingly and intentionally, without a reasonable good faith basis;
. . .” Instruction 10 (emphasis added). Apprising jurors that Rasmussen was
guilty if he acted “without a reasonable good faith basis” regarding two of
the 12 counts misstates the law because a good faith belief would have been
a defense to all 12 counts. Rasmussen was charged with six counts of failure
to file and six counts of tax evasion, each of which requires willfulness,
which is, as a matter of law, negated by good faith.
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More specifically, the negative wording in the Jury Instructions—
“without a reasonable good faith basis”—properly advises the jury that a
lack of good faith may be a basis for guilt, but does not affirmatively advise
jurors that the presence of good faith requires acquittal.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the mens rea instruction
misstates the law because it provided jurors with an unnecessary and
redundant opportunity to return a guilty verdict. As defined by this Court,
acting “knowingly and willfully” is the same as acting “without good faith.”
See Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ¶20 (“[I[f a jury instruction ‘already contains
a specific statement of the government’s burden to prove the[ ] elements of
the crime, the good faith instruction is simply a redundant version of the
instruction on those elements’”) (quoting United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d
1097, 1103 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also Favato, 533 F. App'x at 131 (district court
properly submitted separate instruction explaining that good faith “would
be

a

complete

defense—inconsistent

with

his

acting

knowingly,

intentionally, or willfully”). Because lack of good faith is presented as a
separate element of the crime, without any explanation of good faith
generally or an instruction presence of good faith is a defense, jurors could
have found that even though Rasmussen did not act “knowingly and
intentionally,” he nonetheless is guilty because he acted “without a
reasonable good faith basis.” Such an interpretation would have been

-20-

reasonable, but wrong. In short, the instruction misstates the law and likely
prejudiced the outcome of the trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse and remand for a
new trial.
Respectfully submitted on, November 14, 2018.
/s/: Brett J. DelPorto
BRETT J. DELPORTO (6862)
Counsel for Appellant
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by email at criminalappeals@agutah.gov to the Utah Attorney General's Office,
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 15th day of November, 2018.
/s/ Brett J. DelPorto
BRETT J. DELPORTO

-22-

Addendum A
Sentencing, Judgment, and Commitment

-21-

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: October 20, 2017
At the direction of:
09:49:20 AM
/s/ JUDITH S. ATHERTON
District Court Judge
by
/s/ ANDREW ERMER
District Court Clerk
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
STATE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SCOTT ALAN RASMUSSEN,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:
:

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
Case No: 161910347 FS
Judge:
JUDITH S ATHERTON
Date:
October 20, 2017

______________________________________________________________________________________
PRESENT
Clerk:
andrewe
Prosecutor: PALUMBO, MICHAEL D
Defendant Present
The defendant is not in custody
Defendant's Attorney(s): HANSEEN, SAMUEL J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: July 7, 1957
Sheriff Office#: 396129
Audio
Tape Number:
N42
Tape Count: 9:22-9:38

CHARGES
8. FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/30/2017 Guilty
10. FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/30/2017 Guilty
11. TAX EVASION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/30/2017 Guilty
12. FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/30/2017 Guilty
13. PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/30/2017 Dismissed w/ Prejudi
HEARING
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Case No: 161910347 Date:
Oct 20, 2017
______________________________________________________________________________________
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant
is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Prison sentences to run concurrent with each other.

Restitution

Amount: $23930.00 Plus Interest

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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Case No: 161910347 Date:
Oct 20, 2017
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 161910347 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

PRISON RECORDS udc-records@utah.gov
ADC TRANSPORT ADC-Transportation@slco.org

10/20/2017
Date: ____________________

/s/ ANDREW ERMER
______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Proposed Legislation

West’s Utah Code Annotated
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 8. Offenses Against the Administration of Government
Part 11. Taxation
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-1101
§ 76-8-1101. Criminal offenses and penalties relating to revenue and taxation-Rulemaking authority--Statute of limitations

Currentness

(1)(a) As provided in Section 59-1-401, criminal offenses and penalties are as
provided in Subsections (1)(b) through (e).(b)(i) Any person who is required by
Title 59, Revenue and Taxation, or any laws the State Tax Commission
administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or permit from the
State Tax Commission, who operates without having registered or secured a
license or permit, or who operates when the registration, license, or permit is
expired or not current, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1)(b)(i),
the penalty may not:
(A) be less than $500; or
(B) exceed $1,000.
-22-

(c)(i) With respect to a tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401, any
person who knowingly and intentionally, and without a reasonable good faith
basis, fails to make, render, sign, or verify any return within the time required by
law or to supply any information within the time required by law, or who makes,
renders, signs, or verifies any false or fraudulent return or statement, or who
supplies any false or fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1)(c)(i),
the penalty may not:
(A) be less than $1,000; or
(B) exceed $5,000.
(d)(i) Any person who intentionally or willfully attempts to evade or defeat
any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401 or the payment of a tax, fee,
or charge as defined in Section 59-1-401 is, in addition to other penalties provided
by law, guilty of a second degree felony.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1)(d)(i),
the penalty may not:
(A) be less than $1,500; or
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(B) exceed $25,000.
(e)(i) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if that person commits an
act:
(A) described in Subsection (1)(e)(ii) with respect to one or more of the
following documents:
(I) a return;
(II) an affidavit;
(III) a claim; or
(IV) a document similar to Subsections (1)(e)(i)(A)(I) through (III); and
(B) subject to Subsection (1)(e)(iii), with knowledge that the document
described in Subsection (1)(e)(i)(A):
(I) is false or fraudulent as to any material matter; and
(II) could be used in connection with any material matter administered by
the State Tax Commission.
(ii) The following acts apply to Subsection (1)(e)(i):
(A) preparing any portion of a document described in Subsection
(1)(e)(i)(A);
(B) presenting any portion of a document described in Subsection
(1)(e)(i)(A);
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(C) procuring any portion of a document described in Subsection
(1)(e)(i)(A);
(D) advising in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a
document described in Subsection (1)(e)(i)(A);
(E) aiding in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a
document described in Subsection (1)(e)(i)(A);
(F) assisting in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a
document described in Subsection (1)(e)(i)(A); or
(G) counseling in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a
document described in Subsection (1)(e)(i)(A).
(iii) This Subsection (1)(e) applies:
(A) regardless of whether the person for which the document
described in Subsection (1)(e)(i)(A) is prepared or presented:
(I) knew of the falsity of the document described in Subsection
(1)(e)(i)(A); or
(II) consented to the falsity of the document described in Subsection
(1)(e)(i)(A); and
(B) in addition to any other penalty provided by law.
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(iv) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of this Subsection (1)(e),
the penalty may not:
(A) be less than $1,500; or
(B) exceed $25,000.
(v) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act, the State Tax Commission may make rules prescribing the
documents that are similar to Subsections (1)(e)(i)(A)(I) through (III).
(2) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is
the later of six years:
(a) from the date the tax should have been remitted; or
(b) after the day on which the person commits the criminal offense.
Credits
Laws 1987, c. 3, § 57; Laws 2001, c. 177, § 2, eff. July 1, 2001; Laws 2004, c. 67, § 2,
eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2183, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 336, § 2,
eff. March 25, 2009; Laws 2014, c. 52, § 2, eff. May 13, 2014.
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